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Abstract
This paper examines the contextual conditions for
users’ career concern as a motivational driver of
contributions in online collaboration communities. On
the data of user-level activities from a computer
programming-related online Q&A community (Stack
Overflow), merged with job-market data for softwaredeveloper, we find robust evidence of a positive
association between individual users’ career concern
and their contributions. More important, we find that
this positive relationship is further strengthened
through the contextual conditions: the number of
vacancies in the job market, the expected salaries from
these jobs, and the transparency in the flow of careerrelated information within the community. We
contribute to the literature on motivation in online
collaboration communities. Our study thus offers
insight into how career concern can be effectively
utilized to motivate contributors in these communities.
Our findings also foreshadow a possible paradigm
change by characterizing online collaboration
communities as institutions of career concern and skill
signaling.

1. Introduction
The motivation of voluntary contributions to online
communities of knowledge production and exchange
has stimulated a deep interest in information systems
researchers and practitioners [5,8,14,26,29,36,40,45].
One of the most relevant drivers of motivation is the
starting or pushing forward of a professional career
related to the community topic [30], to which we refer
as career concern. For example, hobbyist product
designers can kick-off a professional career by
demonstrating their talent in design communities [17].
The notion of career concern as motivation is especially
relevant for software developers because a large portion
of their skills is difficult to observe for potential
employers.
Traditionally, people’s career concern and their
seeking for jobs have been directly embedded into the
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institutions of higher education such as colleges and
universities. By certifying individuals’ performance in the
form of degrees and diplomas, these institutions allow
them to signal their job-related skills to potential
employers [23,39]. We argue that crowd-based online
communities of knowledge production and sharing
[5,8,14,45] can serve a similar role. These communities
contain a large variety and depth of user skills that are
often highly relevant for employers. In addition to
multiple other forms of motivation [36], career concern
has been shown to be an important source of motivation
for making contributions to these communities [26,30],
suggesting that online communities can in principle
fulfill the function of institutions of career concern.
However, career concern has been treated in the
literature of online collaboration communities as a
largely static construct [20,26,36], with little light on the
conditions for the career concern to unfold. Therefore,
we study the contextual conditions that support or
inhibit the contributions of career-concerned users in
online collaboration communities. By shedding light on
the contextual conditions, we attempt to develop an
understanding of when and how career concern is more
likely to unfold and stimulate contributions. Building on
the labor market literature [15,16,23,38,39], we develop
a framework on the contextual influences of career
concern, consisting of three conditions: number of job
vacancies, expected salaries, and community–market
information transparency. Job vacancies are the current
number of job openings in the labor market, expected
salaries are the current wages associated with these
vacancies, and community–market information
transparency is the degree to which community
members and external recruiters can observe
information about each other. To empirically examine
this framework, we pose the following research
question: How do external job-market conditions (job
vacancies and expected salary) and community-based
market conditions (information transparency) shape the
relationship between career motivation and user
contributions in online collaboration communities?
Our empirical strategy is to utilize individual-level
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contribution data from Stack Overflow, an online
collaboration community founded in September 2008.
In Stack Overflow users post questions and answers
(Q&As) on computer programming-related issues for a
large variety of programming languages. In particular,
we exploit Stack Overflow Careers1, which is an intracommunity career service. Stack Overflow Careers
allows users to post a curriculum vitae (CV) and
external recruiters to browse CVs and identify
promising job candidates. Because users’ achievements
in the community—in the form of reputation scores—
appear in their CVs, the users can signal their
programming skills directly to the recruiters. Based on
how much effort the users may have exerted to construct
their CVs, we quantify their interest in a programmingrelated career (i.e., career concern). Moreover, the
introduction of Stack Overflow Careers was an
exogenous event that drastically improved information
transparency in the community. To capture the
contextual conditions of the market for programming
jobs, we obtain data from IT Jobs Watch2, a company
that tracks IT-related job advertisements in the United
Kingdom. The data contain the quarterly number of job
vacancies and the offered salaries in over 110
programming languages.
We find that a user’s CV length—our proxy for a
user’s career concern—is positively related to both the
quantity and quality of the user’s contributions. This
relationship becomes stronger when there are more job
vacancies in the corresponding programming language
and the expected salary from these jobs is higher.
Increases in community–market transparency also
positively moderates the relationship between career
concern and user contribution. These results are robust
to variations in the sample and estimation methods. The
positive association between career concern and user
contribution is particularly salient for the posts that
could potentially earn more reputation points for the
users. The career-motivated boost in user contribution
appears to spill over to non-programming language
domains as well, though the magnitude for nonprogramming language domains is smaller than for
language domains, which are presumably more
conducive to signaling job skills. These results are
consistent with career-motivated users optimally
allocating their effort to maximize returns from
investing private resources.
Our study contributes to the growing literature on
motivation in online collaboration communities [14]
such as Q&A sites [45], open source software
development [13,36,40], communities of practice
[19,21,42], and collaborative knowledge production
[2,32]. First, we provide a framework describing the
1

http://business.stackoverflow.com/careers/

contextual conditions for career concern to be effective.
The framework reinforces the role of extrinsic
motivations for contributors to online knowledge
production and exchange. Specifically, we extend the
current understanding of motivation based on career
concern [26,30,36] by the notion of community–market
transparency, that is, the ease of information flow
between job seekers and recruiters. Community–market
information transparency suggests an effective way to
utilize users’ career concerns for addressing the
challenges of attracting and motivating users and
thereby promoting the overall viability of online
communities. We also extend the literature by providing
behavioral evidence based on archival data, thus
overcoming the limitation of survey-based methods
[26,30,36] and anecdotal evidence [22,34].
More broadly, our framework sheds new light on
online collaboration communities by characterizing their
emerging role as institutions of career-related signaling, a
role that has historically been exclusive to universities
and other forms of higher education. Our findings
indicate strong functional resemblances of online
collaboration communities to these traditional institutions
[3,23,39]. Thus, our study challenges a conventional
paradigm on institutions of career signaling: knowledge
workers are now able to signal their quality and job
skills without necessarily relying on the traditional
signaling institutions. We submit that this new paradigm
of signaling provides considerable advantages in terms
of cost and accuracy. It is quite likely that online
collaboration communities will play a more
fundamental role as signaling institutions in the near
future.

2. Hypotheses development
We specify our framework into several testable
hypotheses (see Figure 1). We first develop a baseline
hypothesis on the relationship between career concern
and user contribution. We then elaborate on the three
contextual conditions as moderators of this baseline.

Figure 1: Research model

2.1. Career concern and user contributions
Most fundamentally, we expect that a significant
share of community users is interested in the prospects
2

http://www.itjobswatch.co.uk
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of entering or advancing a career related to their
community activities. This form of motivation has been
extensively researched in the context of open source
software development [20,26,30,36] and, to a lesser
extent, in other forms of online collaboration
communities such as profession-specific communities
of practice [42], open innovation communities [37], and
Q&A communities [43]. Users will of course vary in the
degree of their career concern. Some users may be
uninterested in careers but still contribute for other
reasons [36], while others might have a strong
inclination for career seeking. The latter, we refer to as
career-concerned or career-motivated users.
The theoretical backbone for linking career concern
to contribution behavior is signaling theory [23,39],
which suggests that career-motivated users will try to
demonstrate their otherwise-unobserved skills by
contributing to their community. Here, their ability to
provide costly contributions is considered as evidence
for their skills. Therefore, for a baseline, we expect a
positive association between a user’s career concern and
the level of his contributions.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A user’s career concern is
positively related to the user’s contributions.

[15,16,44]. This suggests that job vacancies are very
likely to positively affect the signaling activities of
career-concerned users.
This positive moderation of job vacancies is also
consistent with the expectancy theory of motivation
[41]. The theory, rooted in the question of career
concern and job-related motivation [31,41], postulates
the relationship between an individual’s effort and the
desirability of the individual’s goal and the expected
probability of goal achievement. The higher the
desirability or the expectation of achieving it, the more
effort the individual will exert [6]. Applying the
expectancy theory of motivation to signaling in online
collaboration communities suggests a positive effect of
job vacancies on the baseline relationship. Careerconcerned users will intensify their signaling effort
when the prospect of achieving their career goals
appears higher (expectation increases). Thus, we expect
that the association between a user’s career concern and
her contributions strengthens as the number of job
vacancies increases.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The number of job vacancies
in the market positively moderates the relationship
between a user’s career concern and the user’s
contributions.

2.2 Number of job vacancies
2.3. Expected salary
The number of job vacancies is the first factor in
our framework and a key motivator for career-interested
users. Compared to other decision-related indicators, the
number of job openings provides a clearly identifiable
information that helps career-motivated users develop
an objective insight into the current state of the job
market. Such information will then facilitate the
decision of career-motivated users on how much effort
to exert in contribution-based signaling.
From a pure bargaining perspective, one might
expect a negative effect of the number of job vacancies
on the baseline relationship: more vacancies imply
decreased competition among job seekers and greater
bargaining power for them relative to recruiters, thereby
reducing the need for signaling. As such, careerconcerned users may reduce their effort. However, from
the cost-benefit based rational choice perspective,
career-motivated users might actually increase their
signaling effort in response to greater job availability.
That is because the more jobs for a specific skill are
available, the more attractive it will appear for an
individual user to make investments in activities that
may aid in obtaining a job. In fact, empirical
investigations in traditional labor markets support a
positive effect of job availability by showing that the
market demand such as the number of available jobs has
a positive effect on career decision-making such as job
market entry and education degree attainment

Similar to the number of job vacancies, the salary
that a career-concerned user can expect from a job is a
key moderator of the relationship between career
concern and user contributions. For three reasons, we
predict a positive influence of the expected salary on the
baseline relationship. First, in general, there is a strong
link between monetary incentives and human behavior
[27], especially between expected income and career
selection [15,38]. Second, job seekers can easily
perceive and evaluate expected salary, and thus react to
it. It is a straightforward criterion, which simplifies the
comparison between different career alternatives, and
hence it is likely to be used by the career-motivated
users as a decision criterion. Third, compared to other
job-decision criteria such as the location, size, or
organizational structure of the employer, salary
preferences are relatively homogeneous across
individuals. All else equal, one would prefer more salary
over less, whereas other preferences such as work
location might vary widely among users. Because of
these reasons, the expected salary is likely to exert a
clearer effect than most other criteria.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The expected salary from the
available jobs positively moderates the relationship
between a user’s career concern and the user’s
contribution
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2.4. Community–market transparency
The third and final contingent factor in our
framework is the information flow between community
and the job market. We refer to this contingency as
community–market transparency, which represents the
ease of information flows between community users and
external recruiters.
In general, transparency reduces the costs of
transactions (for empirical evidence in financial
markets, see [7,12]). Thus, we expect that in the context
of online collaboration communities, greater
transparency in the job-matching process should reduce
frictions and search costs by improving information
flows between the supply side (job seekers in the
community) and the demand side (external recruiters).
In several ways, community–market transparency
benefits the job-seeking users in pursuing their career
goals. Under greater transparency, these users can
observe more and better information about opportunities
in the job market. Community–market transparency also
lowers the effective cost of sending signals, as it allows
users to target selected employers instead of spreading
their signaling effort across numerous targets. Morefocused signaling efforts on a select set of employers at
a given cost allow the career-concerned users to produce
more and/or higher-quality signals.
On the demand side, community–market
transparency has several merits for external recruiters.
They can more easily target the talent. Greater
transparency means an improved quality of the signals,
which helps recruiters better screen job candidates,
thereby facilitating their hiring decisions. These benefits
for recruiters, in turn, create positive feedback for the
supply side of the market, encouraging more users to
seek career opportunities through the community. Gains
from greater market transparency will then draw more
recruiters to the market. “Thick market externalities”
[11,18] may thus result: the job market becomes
populated with more players on both sides, leading to a
higher likelihood of matching between job seekers and
recruiters and making both sides better off.
These benefits offered by community–market
transparency suggest that career-motivated users will
likely adjust their contribution level responding to the
degree of transparency. Under greater transparency, any
changes in the job market get transmitted to careermotivated users with less information loss. Likewise,
with greater transparency, career-concerned users can
expect their signals to more precisely reach recruiters.
Hence, career-concerned users will find signaling
through contributions to be more attractive in pursuing
their career goals, thus increasing their contributions
when community–market transparency is high.
Further support can be derived from a behavioral

perspective as well as the expectancy theory of
motivation [41], such as in H2. Greater community–
market transparency increases the prospects of fulfilling
career goals specifically because career-concerned users
are more convinced that the signals they create in the
online community can actually reach the intended
audience (i.e., external recruiters). Without a clear path
to these recruiters, users are less motivated to send a
signal through contributions because there is little
guarantee that the signal will reach the intended
receiver. Thus, under low transparency, users’ career
motivation remains largely latent and users are less
likely to consider contributions as opportunities to
signal. This weakens the link between career concern
and user contribution. However, with a clearer and more
effective information channel in place, the community
and the activities inside it become more visible to
external recruiters. Realizing this will in turn boost the
motivation of career-concerned users to send signals
through increased contribution. Hence, the link between
career concern and user contribution gets strengthened.
That is, given the level of career concern, a greater level
of contribution is better justified. Together, these
reasons suggest that under greater community–market
transparency, the association between career concern
and user contribution will become stronger.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Information transparency
between the supply and demand sides of the job market
(community–market
transparency)
positively
moderates the relationship between a user’s career
concern and the user’s contributions.

3. Empirical design
Our research context is Stack Overflow, a free and
public online Q&A platform for computer
programming-related issues. Career concern is highly
relevant for the users in this online collaboration
communities. According to a survey of over 56,000
users, more than three-quarters of the respondents
expressed interests in a programming-related career by
indicating that they were either actively looking for a job
(15.5%) or open to new job opportunities (62.7%).
Stack Overflow has a career service, “Stack
Overflow Careers.” This service allows users to create a
CV certifying their reputation scores. Paying recruiters
can custom-search the CVs and list job advertisements.
Thus, users can leverage their activities and reputation
in the community as a signal and thus present
themselves to potential employers. The community
introduced this service in two stages. The initial version
launched on (November 3, 2009) charged fees to both
community users (a one-time $25) and recruiters
(amount undisclosed). In the subsequent version “Stack
Overflow Careers 2.0” (launched on February 23,
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2011), Stack Overflow eliminated fees for community
users. This change has considerably relaxed the users’
constraint, making it much easier for them to use Stack
Overflow Careers.
We believe that the introduction of Stack Overflow
Careers has decidedly increased community–market
transparency. Stack Overflow’s original intention was
to help users find better jobs, rather than to directly
promote user contributions. With the career service
platform in place, job-seeking users can much more
efficiently signal their quality to the recruiters. In
particular, they can directly target the employers and
jobs that match their career goals. Likewise, recruiters
can identify and access qualified candidates more easily
and at considerably lower costs. Hence, the introduction
of Stack Overflow Careers must have significantly
enhanced the transparency of the job market relevant to
the users in the online collaboration community.
We downloaded from the community’s website the
entire user activity data in Stack Overflow over a time
period of 5 years, from the outset of the community to
June 2013. The raw dataset contains 14,630,209 Q&As
written by 2,055,496 unique users. We also obtained
job-market demand data from IT Jobs Watch, a
company that maintains historical records of the IT job
market in the U.K. The dataset contains quarterly data
of the number of job vacancies and average salary offers
for 113 programming languages from 2006 to 2015.
Thus, each of these programming languages represents
a segment of the IT job market. We only included users
who contributed a total of at least 10 answers. The panel
has 684,000 user-quarter observations of 72,444 users.
Our dependent variable should capture the level
of user contribution. Users can contribute to the
community by posting frequently, or making highquality posts, or both. However, quality is observed only
when a user makes any post. Hence, we primarily
measure user contribution by the count of posts. To
construct Quantity of contribution, we counted the
number of total posts that a user made in each quarter.
Because a user can contribute to multiple knowledge
domains (language and non-language) but our jobmarket data are specific to a programming language, we
need to assign a primary language for each user-quarter
observation. That way, we can precisely link the user
response to demand changes in a specific programming
language. Hence, we designated for each user-quarter
the primary language based on his activity in the
preceding four quarters.
We also considered Quality of contribution. For a
given post, other community users can evaluate it by
voting up (+1) or down (-1). The resulting score netting
these votes indicates the overall perceived quality of a
contribution. We thus constructed a quality measure
using the sum of net votes for the contributions in each

user-quarter.
Each of our four hypotheses requires an
independent variable. For the baseline hypothesis
(H1), we need a measure that captures the degree to
which a user is interested in seeking a career. For this,
we exploited the CVs posted on Stack Overflow
Careers, which reveal two important pieces of
information about users’ career concern: whether a user
has posted a CV to the site and what content the CV
contains. We use the estimated level of effort to create a
CV as a proxy for a user’s career concern. All else equal,
a longer CV will take more time and effort to put
together and thus represent a greater level of career
concern than a shorter CV. To construct the CV-based
measure of career concern, we first searched the CVs of
all users in our sample (74,008). Of these, 34,007 users
(46%) have posted their CVs. We then constructed CV
length by counting the number of words contained in
each CV. This is our primary measure of the user’s
career concern. We assigned zero for the users with no
CVs posted.
For testing H2, we captured the Number of job
vacancies as the quarterly count of job advertisements
for each programming language, compiled by the
company IT Jobs Watch. For testing H3, we computed
Expected salary as the quarterly average salaries offered
for the permanent jobs in a given programming
language, also collected by IT Jobs Watch. For the
construction of Community–market transparency (H4),
we exploited the introduction of Stack Overflow
Careers. As discussed earlier, this career service
promotes the information flow in both directions
between community users and external recruiters.
Recruiters can advertise job vacancies in a standardized
format, which makes it easier for the users to find
appropriate job postings. The service also improves the
quality of the users’ signaling of their skills. Reputation
scores earned through knowledge contributions are
available to recruiters, who can then compare across
multiple candidates on a common standard. Stack
Overflow Careers initially charged fees for both the
users and the recruiters but later made it free for the
users after some time. We chose to distinguish between
before and after the elimination of user fees (“Stack
Overflow Careers 2.0”), which decisively made the
service popular within the community, and constructed
a binary variable called Post to indicate low (0) and high
(1) community–market transparency.
It is important to note that all the moderators
representing the three contingent factors in our
framework are exogenous to the community users. The
number of vacancies and expected salaries are beyond
the control of individual users and difficult to predict in
a precise manner. The introduction of Stack Overflow
Careers and the change of fees were also exogenous.
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Most of our control variables consist of a series of
fixed effects to account for possible confounding
influences from other covariates of contribution
activity. To account for the time-invariant user-level
unobserved heterogeneity, we included dummies for
individual users. Also, because other job-market
conditions and user contribution behavior may differ
across programming languages, we included dummies
for programming languages. Quarter dummies were
included to account for possible temporal variations.
Programming-language-fixed effects and quarter-fixed
effects were included in all estimation models.
However, testing H1 prevents us from including userfixed effects because our measure of career concern (CV
length) is time-invariant within the user. Hence, when
testing H1, we used a random-effects model. Users may
vary in experience, which may confound the effect of
CV length. Thus, we controlled for user experience by
including community tenure, measured by the number
of days since the user joined the community. To account
for the possible heterogeneity in writing propensity
across users, we included the average length of posts
(time-invariant) for each user in random-effects models.
This variable may also capture some of the
heterogeneity across users in writing style (some users
tend to write longer than others) and hence partially
correct for the baseline inter-user differences in CV
length. We log-transformed all continuous variables to
reduce heteroskedasticity. We used Stata 15.

4. Results
Model 1 in Table 3 shows the relationship of career
concern with the quantity of user contribution using the
(log) number of posts as the dependent variable.
Consistent with our baseline hypothesis (H1), the
coefficient on CV length as a proxy for career concern
is strongly positive (Model 1). The estimated elasticity
(0.032) implies that doubling the length of posted user
CV is associated with a 3.2% increase in the user’s
volume of contributions to the online community.
Models 2-6 include user-fixed effects, where CV
length needed to be dropped due to it perfect collinearity
with user fixed effects (CV length is time-invariant
within user). In Model 3 we find a significant and
positive interaction of CV length and Number of job
vacancies showing that the career concern–user
contribution relationship is positively moderated by the
number of vacancies. The career-driven users contribute
more frequently when there are more jobs in their
programming language available in the market, which
supports H2.

Table 1: Quantity of contribution
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(Log) # of
days since
join

-0.356** -0.284** -0.284** -0.284** -0.284** -0.284**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)

(Log)
Average
length of
posts

0.352**
(0.008)

(Log) CV
length

0.032**
(0.002)

(Log) # job
vacancies

0.027*
(0.011)

0.027*
(0.011)

0.021+
(0.011)

0.027*
(0.011)

0.027*
(0.011)

0.023*
(0.011)

(Log)
Expected
salary

0.060
(0.044)

0.025
(0.045)

0.025
(0.045)

-0.036
(0.048)

0.024
(0.045)

-0.028
(0.048)

(Log) CV
length
× (Log) #
job vacancies
(Log) CV
length
× (Log)
Expected
Salary
(Log) CV
length
× (Dummy)
Post
Constant

0.004**
(0.001)

0.003**
(0.001)

0.048**
(0.014)

0.041**
(0.014)

0.013** 0.012**
(0.003) (0.003)

0.610
(0.508)

3.046** 3.053** 3.053** 3.059** 3.069**
(0.523) (0.524) (0.522) (0.523) (0.524)

User FE
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Language FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Quarter FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
682710 682710 682710 682710 682710 682710
Within R2
0.102
0.103
0.103
0.103
0.103
0.103
Note: The dependent variable in all models is the (log) number of posts
received by the user in a given quarter. “Yes” or “No” indicates whether or
not the corresponding fixed effects are included in the model. Robust
standard errors, clustered by users, are in parentheses. +, *, ** denotes
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Model 4 tests the interaction between CV length
and Expected salary. This interaction is significant and
positive related to user contribution quantity, indicating
that the career-driven users respond to a greater degree
when the available jobs offer higher salaries. The firstorder effect of Expected salary is statistically
insignificant as in other models. This suggests that any
effect of expected salary on user contribution occurs
only in conjunction with the user’s career concern,
consistent with our moderation hypothesis. Hence, we
found support for H3.
In Model 5, we obtain a significantly positive
coefficient on the interaction term between CV length
and the Post. This supports H4, which predicts a positive
moderation of community–market transparency on the
career concern–user contribution relationship. Thus, we
find evidence that career-motivated users contribute
more frequently when information flows in the job
market are under greater transparency. Considering all
explanatory variables at once did not change the results
(Model 6).
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Table 2: Quality of contribution
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(Log) # of
days since
join

-0.312** -0.271** -0.271** -0.271** -0.271** -0.271**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)

(Log)
Average
length of
posts

0.439**
(0.010)

(Log) CV
length

0.034**
(0.002)

(Log) # job
vacancies

-0.052** -0.053** -0.060** -0.053** -0.053** -0.058**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)

(Log)
Expected
salary
(Log) CV
length
× (Log) #
job vacancies
(Log) CV
length
× (Log)
Expected
Salary
(Log) CV
length
× (Dummy)
Post
Constant

0.144*
(0.056)

0.154** 0.154**
(0.057) (0.057)

0.088
(0.061)

0.005**
(0.002)

0.152**
(0.057)

0.097
(0.061)

0.004*
(0.002)

0.052**
(0.019)

0.044*
(0.019)

0.014** 0.012**
(0.004) (0.004)

0.586
(0.635)

3.234** 3.241** 3.242** 3.248** 3.259**
(0.656) (0.658) (0.655) (0.656) (0.657)

User FE
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Language FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Quarter FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
678139 678139 678139 678139 678139 678139
Within R2
0.157
0.157
0.157
0.157
0.157
0.157
Note: The dependent variable in all models is the (log) number of votes
received by the user in a given quarter. “Yes” or “No” indicates whether or
not the corresponding fixed effects are included in the model. Robust
standard errors, clustered by users, are in parentheses. +, *, ** denotes
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

So far, we have focused on the number of posts
(Quantity of contribution) as a measure of user
contributions. The other measure of user contribution is
quality (Quality of contribution), which represents the
usefulness of the contributions indicated by votes (from
other users). From the perspective of an online
collaboration community as a knowledge depository,
promoting contents of high quality is perhaps equally, if
not, more important than sheer quantity. Thus, posting
high-quality content is also an effective way of signaling
their skills to potential recruiters. Hence, in the next
step, we look at the quality of user contribution and use
the (log) number of votes received as the dependent
variable (Table 2).
Models 1 through 6 in Table 2 replicate the
corresponding models in Table 1. The results are very
similar to that in the analysis of contribution volume:
Quality is strongly and positively associated with CV
length (Model 1); and the interactions of CV length with
the number of job vacancies (Model 3), expected salary

(Model 4), and the community–market transparency
dummy (Model 5) are significantly positive in all
models, including the full model (Model 6). Hence, the
results suggest that career-motivated users respond to
the market conditions by adjusting not only the
frequency of their contribution but also the quality of the
posts. This is reasonable because while the volume of
contribution influences the visibility of a user in the
community, it is the quality of contribution reflected in
the reputation scores that determine the user’s status.
Hence, users with a greater career concern have a clear
incentive to boost both the quantity and quality of
contributions. Overall, our analysis of user contribution
provides solid support for all hypotheses.
To improve the credibility in CV length as proxy
for career concern, we developed two robustness
checks. First, we distinguished between the types of user
contribution by separately looking at user posting of
questions versus user posting of answers to others’
questions. This analysis tests whether the users who we
consider as career-concerned optimize their signaling
behavior by focusing on contributions that might
promise more signaling gains (i.e., answers, not
questions).The test clearly shows that answers are more
sensitive to the CV length than questions (roughly three
times as sensitive). This provides support for using CV
length as a proxy for career concern. Second, in a similar
way we divided user contributions into two categories:
posts in programming-language domains and those in
non-programming-language domains. If CV length is a
proper proxy for career concern, we would expect to
measure that career-motivated users concentrated their
efforts on specific knowledge domains (i.e.,
programming languages) that might be more
representative of their skills so as to better signal their
skills to external recruiters. We found that the effects
driven by CV length are stronger when it comes to
programming-related contributions.

5. Discussion
Our results provide strong evidence for our
framework on the conditions of career concern as a
significant motivator of user contributions in online
collaboration. We document systematic relationships
between users’ career interests, job-market demand
indicators, transparency in information flow, and the
quantity and quality of user contributions to the
community. We first confirm a positive link between a
user’s career concern and the user’s contributions
[26,36,43]. Our analyses further show that changes in
job-market demand conditions (number of vacancies
and offered salaries) for a user-specific programming
language skill positively moderate this career concern–
user contribution relationship. Finally, we find that the
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increased community–market transparency, owing to
the availability of Stack Overflow Careers, strengthens
the positive relationship between career concern and
user contribution.

5.1. Contribution to theory
Our study provides multiple implications for
existing theory. We show that the motivating role of
career concern is subject to market- and communitylevel contingencies, extending and improving on prior
research that has primarily focused on the direct effect
of career concern on user contribution [26,36,43]. Based
on large-scale archival data, we validate career concern
as a motivational driver. More importantly, we identify
the contextual conditions that unleash career concern.
Our framework on the contextual conditions of career
concern builds on the human capital theory and labor
market theory, which identified the number of open jobs
and the expected salaries as positive influences of career
choices [15,16]. In addition, the labor market literature
indicates the importance of information transparency
[4,25]. By demonstrating the relevance of these
conditions for online collaboration communities, we
introduce a contingency theory of career concern in
online collaboration. Together, these three conditions
account for a more complete and coherent picture of
career concern as a motivational driver in online
collaboration communities.
Our characterization of online collaboration
communities as institutions for career concern has a
strong implication for our understanding of the
traditional institutions fulfilling that role. These
institutions are the places of higher education, first and
foremost the universities [3,23,39]. Comparing online
collaboration communities to these traditional
institutions prompts us to conjecture a possible
paradigm shift in the configuration of signaling
institutions. Traditionally, the function of the
institutions of higher education is to certify the
achievements of their “users” (i.e., students). Thus, they
enable the students to signal their hidden skills and
thereby improve their career prospects [3,39]. Our
observations from Stack Overflow and the software
developer job market suggest that online collaboration
communities are also able to perform this role.
Moreover, online collaboration communities even have
a critical advantage over the institutions of higher
education in fulfilling this role. The institutions of
higher education contribute solely to the creation of the
signal and the immediate outcome of the signal
production process (i.e., exams and assignments) is
usually wasted: “[S]tudents do work hard, because of
reputation effects, even though it is entirely wasteful
from a social point of view” [23:177]. In stark contrast,

in online collaboration communities, the creation of the
signal must provide an immediate benefit for other
community users. Each contribution has at least one
beneficiary (the asker of the question) and most often
multiple beneficiaries, whose votes indicate the value
they gain from the contributed content. In this way, the
contribution’s actual value is tightly coupled to the
signal. Because of this coupling, we contend that online
collaboration communities as institutions of career
concern reduce the “waste” relative to the traditional
signaling institutions. This represents a critical welfare
advantage. Therefore, it might be that online
collaboration communities can substitute the traditional
institutions in their role as signal enablers for certain
job-related qualities. This would mean a paradigm
change with an impact on social welfare.
Another advantage of online collaboration
communities as a signaling institution could be that
inexperienced job-seekers could gain an easier entry to
the job market. Because of the tight coupling between
real-world values of the contribution and signal, online
collaboration communities can help overcome the socalled career progression paradox, the problem that
recruiters demand experienced job seekers but to
acquire experience, the job seekers need a job [33].
Our study generalizes the role of career concern in
user contribution beyond the context of open source
software development, from which the original theory
and literature of motivation by career concern emerged
[30,36]. Our context differs from open source software
development, which takes place in relatively more
integrated organizations and handles more interrelated
tasks such as coding, testing, and code integration [28].
Our context is based on flat structures [14] with virtually
fully decomposable, atomic tasks. Nonetheless, our
study also confirms the role of career motivation under
these seemingly unfavorable conditions for pursuing
career opportunities. Because online collaboration
communities provide an arguably more conservative
setting, we believe that our findings can be extended to
the field of open source software development [30].

5.2. Managerial implication
We offer several implications for practitioners,
especially managers and system designers of online
collaboration communities. Perhaps the most important
challenge for them is to attract and retain active users
[5,9,14,35]. An effective way of achieving this is to
enhance the transparency of career prospects by offering
direct channels to potential employers. Our results
indicate
that
enhancing
community–market
transparency boosts both the quantity and quality of user
contributions to the community. Hence, instituting
features that closer connect job-markets with the
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community and improve the information between them
is a useful strategy. Associated improvements in content
quality facilitated by better community–market
transparency are another merit to utilizing this
instrument. Therefore, for community administrators,
increasing community–market transparency can be a
relatively low-risk high-return strategy for promoting
the success of their community.
Enhancing the community–market transparency is,
of course, possible only if there are significant external
career opportunities that demand for the knowledge and
skills relevant to the community. For instance, for
general Q&A communities such as Answers.com and
Quora, it seems difficult to define what the relevant job
markets are and external job opportunities may hardly
exist. For these communities, community–market
transparency is probably irrelevant. However, there is a
broad range of online collaboration communities that
can utilize community–market transparency as a
motivational instrument. For example, companies that
build on input from communities, such as firms relying
on community-based customer support [24] or those
using ideas and knowledge produced in the community
[1,10,29], may well benefit from career-motivated
participation and are able to create the right conditions
to induce career-based motivation. The hosting
companies themselves represent the demand side of the
job market. Crucial for the hosting company in utilizing
this hiring strategy is to offer well-payed jobs
(corresponding to our variables, number of vacancies
and expected salary) and most importantly, link career
opportunities directly to contributions in the community
and make this relationship clear to the community
members
thus
increasing
community–market
transparency (corresponding to our variable with the
same name).

5.3. Limitations and future research
Our study has several limitations as we discuss
below, which provide interesting avenues for future
research. First, our measure of career concern—CV
length—is admittedly a crude measure, though this is
our best attempt to quantify user career concern based
on secondary data. It is also time-invariant, and hence
conceals potential dynamics in the effect over time. This
is because we do not know the exact timing of the CV
posting. Thus, regardless of when the users posted their
CV to Stack Overflow Careers, we treat them as if they
were career-motivated from the time they appear in the
dataset. However, it is entirely likely that users have
posted their CVs only after they become interested in
seeking careers, which may well be a while since they
have been active in the community. It is also possible
that after posting their CVs, some users have lost

interest in seeking careers but left their CVs on the site.
In either case, the actual link between CV length and
contribution activity for these users will likely be
weaker than assumed. Therefore, our estimate based on
the time-invariant CV measure is likely to be a
conservative one.
Second, our empirical strategy is not suitable for
capturing potential interactions of career concern with
other sources of motivation, especially those of intrinsic
nature. We are not alone in facing this limitation;
scholars have generally analyzed career motivation in
isolation from other forms of motivation (exception is
[36]). Further research incorporating different
motivations and their interactions is needed.
Third, our job-market data cover only the U.K.
Ideally, we would like to have region-specific data on
jobs and salaries and match them with the users in the
corresponding regions. Unfortunately, such data at the
level of the precision of our data is not available.
Though we find generally robust results on a narrower
sample of EU users, caution may be necessary in
applying the findings to the regions with IT labor
markets that deviate considerably from that of the U.K.
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